

THE
JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY

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VOL. LXI, NO. 8: APRIL 9, 1964

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PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

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Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 720 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., 10027. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 720 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., 10027. The annual subscription price (24 numbers) is \$7.50; to students, \$6.00. The price of single numbers is \$0.50; double numbers, \$1.00; complete volumes (from 1960 on), \$12.00.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published bi-weekly (every four weeks in July and August) by Lancaster Press, Inc., Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa., 17604. Editorial Office: 720 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., 10027. President, Albert G. Redpath; Vice President, John H. Randall, Jr.; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Corliss Lamont.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF FAITH

MY aim in this paper is to describe what I entitle a lay, or nonepistemological, conception of faith, an epistemological conception of faith, and a pseudoepistemological conception. Measured by the standard of the first, the second upgrades faith and the third downgrades knowledge; they thus generate paradoxes, and I describe some of these.

I

Call 'I know (You know, etc.) that p ', 'I believe (You believe, etc.) that p ', and 'I have faith (You have faith, etc.) that p ' the K , B , and F transforms of p . Where q is a straightforward logical implicate of p , the K , B , and F transforms of q are not invariably implicates of the K , B , and F transforms of p . For example, 'I know (believe, have faith) that this figure is an Euclidean triangle' does not imply 'I know (believe, have faith) that an exterior angle of this figure is equal to the sum of the interior opposite angles'. On the other hand, 'I know (believe) that my mother will be waiting for me' implies 'I know (believe) that one of my parents will be waiting for me'. But according to what I take to be the most common conception of faith, 'I have faith that my mother will be waiting for me' does not imply 'I have faith that one of my parents will be waiting for me'; I may know that one of my parents will be waiting for me and have faith only that it will be my mother. One of the factors determining whether the K and B transforms of p and its implicate q are logically independent, like the F transforms of p and q , is the presence or absence in q of a predicate which is definitive of a term used in p . However, where p implies q and q gives all the defining properties or a synonym of a term used in p , the F transforms of p and q may be implicates of each other. May be, since although this will be so of 'I have faith that my mother will be waiting for me' and 'I have faith that my female parent will be waiting for me', it will not be so of 'I have faith that my mother has put common salt in the potatoes' and 'I have faith that my female parent has put salt in the potatoes';

I may know that she has put salt in but have faith only that it is common salt, not Glauber's salt.

The logical properties of *F* transforms are importantly different from those of both *K* transforms and *B* transforms, but a description of their straightforward implication relations has been found to yield only a very unstraightforward line of demarcation. Fortunately a quite straightforward line can be drawn where *q* is not a straightforward implicate of *p* but an implicate of both *p* and $\sim p$, i.e., a referential presupposition. 'I know (believe) that the witness is not lying' implies 'I know (believe) that there is a witness'; but 'I have faith that the witness is not lying' does not imply 'I have faith that there is a witness'. Where *p* referentially presupposes *q*, their *K* and *B* transforms are implication-retentive and their *F* transforms implication-unretentive.

II

F transforms are implication-unretentive, however, only for what may be entitled the lay or nonepistemological conception of faith in contradistinction from the epistemological conception exemplified in Aquinas's statements that "Faith is a sort of knowledge" (*De Veritate*, Q. 14, Art. 2) and "The act of faith consists essentially in knowledge" (*ibid.*). Compare "The faithful . . . know them [the things that are of faith], not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith" (*Summa Theologica*, Q. 1. Art. 5). This second conception of faith is not confined to Roman Catholic theologians. Lutherans too analyze the act of faith into trust (*fiducia*), assent (*assensus*), and knowledge (*notitia*). Calvin declares that "we shall possess a right definition of faith if we call it a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit" (*Institutes*, III. II. 7). And the phrase 'certain knowledge' is repeated by Barth when, treating of the statement "The Christian community exists for the world," he warns that "we must be careful not to say that, as distinct from statements grounded in some kind of *a priori* or empirical knowledge, it is 'only' a statement of faith. Precisely as a statement of faith it is a statement of certain knowledge established with a force which cannot be excelled or even equaled. When the Christian community believes that it exists for the world, it knows what it believes" (*Church Dogmatics*, IV. 3. p. 785). Barth thereby admits the currency of a conception of faith according to which a faith claim is not a knowledge claim, but a no-knowledge claim, a knowledge disclaimer.

Hence 'I have faith that p , but perhaps $\sim p$ ' will be self-defeating only where it is a case of the epistemological conception of faith. It will be self-defeating for the same reason as 'I know that p , but perhaps $\sim p$ ' is self-defeating. Likewise for 'You have (He has, etc.) faith that p , but perhaps $\sim p$ '.

Again, in the nonepistemological lay interpretation of faith, but not on the epistemological interpretation, someone can have faith that p in spite of p 's being self-contradictory, provided he doesn't believe that p is self-contradictory. Now although it is apt to use the adjective 'lay' of the nonepistemological conception of faith, this conception is by no means foreign to theological thinking and was perhaps in the minds of that unorthodox minority of later scholastic theologians who held that a proposition could be the object of faith and yet proved false by reason. But this supposition leaves unresolved the puzzle as to how anyone can accept a proposition on faith knowing that he himself has proved it false; and this is apparently what these theologians held, a view even more paradoxical than that reflected in Tertullian's *credibile est, quia ineptum . . . certum est, quia impossibile*. The orthodox scholastic position is that "that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is . . . deemed impossible to be otherwise" (*Summa Theologica, loc. cit.*), and faith is here being conceived epistemologically.

Anyone who knows that p also believes that p , but his claim to know that p will lose its force if he states his belief that p in a "parenthetical" manner.¹ This manner is not being adopted if he asserts 'I not only believe that p , I also know it'. It is being adopted if he asserts ' p , I believe'. Lay faith claims are like parenthetical belief claims and unlike knowledge claims, for they both disclaim knowledge. 'Faith' in the lay sense is related to 'faith' in the epistemological sense rather as the verb 'fish' in its usual sense would be related to the word so redefined that a man could not be said to have fished until he had a catch. The close logical kinship of faith claims and belief claims is evidenced in the practice of referring to the faithful also as believers and in the fact that articles of faith are formulated in *creeds*; though a theologian who had given a high redefinition of 'faith' could be expected not to allow these linguistic facts to deter him from giving a high redefinition of 'belief'. No attempt will be made here to produce grounds for ascribing chronological and logical priority

¹ See J. O. Urmson, "Parenthetical Verbs," *Mind*, 61 (1952), reprinted in Antony Flew, ed., *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956).

to the lay conception. Whether or not the theologians in question are *redefining* 'faith', it is not difficult to explain why they define the word in the way they do. Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians and others maintain that faith is a gift and the objects of faith revealed truths. And the theologians themselves are among the faithful. They are committed. That there is Someone who reveals these truths is with them an article of faith or, with some of them, a conclusion of reason. The theologian is nevertheless under an obligation to take cognizance of the lay conception; for if the epistemological conception were the only one, nobody could have faith in the goodness of Mohammed or Woden or/and Freya unless 'Mohammed', 'Woden', and 'Freya' were names for the God of Christianity. This, though an elegant proof of monotheism, is wantonly paradoxical.

III

John Hick says that his *Faith and Knowledge*² is a study of "faith as cognition" (xii), i.e., the "state, act, or procedure which may be compared with standard instances of knowing and believing" (xi). Although he agrees with Tillich, Calvin, and the author of the Fourth Gospel, that cognitive faith (*fides*) and faith as trust (*fiducia*) are interdependent (186), it is only with the former that he is concerned in this book; and although he has a great deal to contribute on the topic of propositional knowledge, he again follows Tillich, Calvin, and St. John in contending that it is with nonpropositional knowledge that religious faith is more directly connected. "That we 'know God by faith' means that we interpret, not only this or that item of our experience, but our experience as a whole, in theistic terms; we find that in and through the entire field of our experience we are having to do with God and he with us" (165). He does not, however, reserve the word 'knowledge' for occasions where there is knowledge in the standard English usage of the word. True, as has just been shown, he describes religious faith as a way of knowing God (cf. 217), but he is explicit that this is not knowledge in the standard English usage of the term. The conception of faith with which he works may consequently be designated pseudoepistemological in contrast with the nonepistemological and epistemological conceptions already considered. Authentic exponents of the epistemological conception of faith abide by the high lay account of knowledge according to which a man cannot know that *p* unless *p* is true and cannot know (have personal experience of) *X* unless *X* exists. Hence, since

² Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.

they wish to maintain that faith is knowledge, they are bound to surrender the low lay conception of faith. Hick too wishes to be able to say that faith is knowledge; so he offers a low analysis of knowledge which he concedes is untraditional. This permits him to stick closer to the low lay conception of faith than do the exponents of the epistemological conception. His analysis is untraditional, but it is not new. He himself states that his account of knowledge as rational certainty is based on Locke's dictum in the second letter to Stillingfleet that "To know and to be certain is the same thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know."

Hick proceeds to develop his neo-Lockean account of knowledge after arguing that there are certain objections which defenders of the classical account cannot meet. But the arguments by which he tries to establish this vulnerability are fallacious. For the defender of the classical account—and of what both Hick and I regard as standard English usage—can consistently agree "that a *claim to know* is a claim . . . to be authoritatively aware that one is believing truly" (21; my italics) while denying that when one *knows* one's knowledge is self-authenticating or self-luminous. He can agree that "to know is to know infallibly" without agreeing that knowledge claims cannot be false; and one occasion on which a claim to know that p is a false claim is when $\sim p$ is true. This is a matter of logic, of definition. Hick supposes that it is a matter of definition that anyone who knows that p must be able to prove p . He slithers from one to the other without appreciating that he is shifting his ground. The fatal step is made at the outset where he writes: "From this background, the background of European rationalism, there has arisen the widely held dogma (which I shall show reasons for rejecting) that to know anything is equivalent to being able to prove it . . . The central tenet of the theory . . . is that knowing (sharply distinguished from believing) is self-authenticating and infallible. We cannot *know* anything that is not in fact the case. That X knows p entails that p is true" (4). My purpose is not to question Hick's right to describe as traditional the doctrine that to know anything is to be able to prove it. Nor do I wish to challenge his attribution of this doctrine to Cook Wilson. Nevertheless I should be very surprised to discover that he is justified in attributing it to Ryle; and as for the view that our language embodies *that* traditional theory (18), surely Moore and Malcolm give the correct reading of standard English usage when they insist that we can according to it know things we cannot prove? Granted, we ordinarily re-

ject a person's claim to know that p not only when $\sim p$ is true but also when he is not, in Hick's phrase, rationally certain, i.e., when his certainty is not "arrived at judiciously and critically" (14). It can also be allowed to Hick that there is no way of distinguishing objective from subjective certainty in so far as we confine ourselves to the psychology or phenomenology of knowledge. This follows tautologically from the two truths that we do not know p unless p and that we are limiting our study to the psychology or phenomenology of knowledge: the issue as to whether p is being put into parenthesis.

It would be safer if what has here been called the phenomenology of knowledge were called instead the phenomenology or logical analysis of knowledge claims. Otherwise we may find ourselves saying that "human knowledge can never rise above the status of subjective certainty" (17) when what we should say is that the feeling of certainty with which a man makes a claim to know something can never be other than subjective, another tautological truth over which no one need lose any sleep.

A phenomenological analysis cannot *ipso facto* be an adequate logical analysis of what it is to know something unless 'knowledge' is redefined. Hick proposes a redefinition, but he is mistaken in his case for concluding that there is a need for one. He is led astray from the start because he invalidly equates the conception of knowledge current in standard English usage with an extremely narrow rationalistic conception which has it that knowing p involves being able to prove p . In the later part of his book he presents an account of religious faith as interpretation or seeing as. He wants to say that faith thus conceived is a way of knowing God and to conclude, in the final sentence of his book, that "By a response to this religious vision of life's significance, through the twin activities of worship and service, the Christian's faith takes on the quality of absolute certainty, which is knowledge." Being sensitive to the lay conception of faith, he realizes that he cannot do justice to it and at the same time uphold the thesis that faith is a sort of knowledge in a rationalistic sense of knowledge. This is so whether the rationalistic sense is taken to be that according to which knowing p entails ability to prove p or that according to which knowing p entails p though not ability to prove p . Hick's problem is therefore to show that an alternative analysis of knowledge is acceptable. Since he is also of the opinion that the lay conception of knowledge is a rationalistic one he feels compelled to make a detour around it. I have argued that this journey is not really necessary, for (a) Hick's strictures

are relevant to an analysis of knowledge which is rationalistic in the strong sense, whereas the lay analysis is rationalistic only in the weak sense, and (b) he erroneously identifies a phenomenological analysis of claiming to know with a logical analysis of knowing.

IV

It may be objected that some of the theologians cited as authentic exponents of the epistemological conception of faith should rather have been cited in support of Hick. For, as was pointed out, both Calvin and Barth employ the phrase 'certain knowledge' (Calvin's word for 'knowledge' being *cognoscere* here and *cognitio* or *notitia* elsewhere). Now if 'knowledge' connotes the lay conception and 'certain' refers to what Hick describes as objective certainty, then 'certain knowledge' is pleonastic. If 'certain' refers to subjective certainty—and Calvin's use of the adjective 'firm' suggests that for him it does—then we have a category mistake unless 'knowledge' is synonymous with 'belief' or 'rational certainty'. Another look at the passages concerned reveals that neither for Calvin nor for Barth is this the correct interpretation. That the truth of *p* or the existence of *X* is for Calvin a further necessary condition of knowing *p* or knowing *X* is put beyond doubt by his clause stipulating that faith is knowledge "founded upon the truth . . . revealed to our minds . . . through the Holy Spirit." And Barth is at this stage speaking of claims to know by faith, not of knowing by faith. And for Barth above all theologians faith is a guaranteed gift. Similarly for Aquinas. In the Article of *De Veritate* from which sentences have already been quoted he writes: "But, in so far as there is certainty of assent, faith is knowledge, and as such can be called certain knowledge and sight." Then, in support of this, he reproduces the following statement from Augustine: "If it is not unfitting to say that we know that also which we believe to be most certain, it follows from this that it is correct to say that we see with our minds the things which we believe, even though they are not present to our senses." Augustine's statement is ambiguous as it stands in isolation. Is it a claim about knowing or is it a metaclaim about claiming to know? Either way it is compatible with the classification of Aquinas among exponents of the epistemological conception of faith. Taken the first way it gives only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for knowing. Taken the second way it asserts something about which Aquinas, Hick, and I do not disagree. Moreover, in another place where Augustine is discussed Aquinas accepts the

proposition that "the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God" (*Summa Theologica*, Q. 4, Art. 2). This demonstrates that for Aquinas the knowledge of faith is infallible.

V

The paradoxes described in this paper will cause least worry among those readers who have noticed that it is the lay conception which is most highly favored by the writers of the New Testament. According to these writers faith is a way to knowledge, a way of finding out, but not a way of knowing.

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THE GRAMMARS OF 'BELIEVE' *

MY main purpose is to show that there are no objects of belief.

This, I know, has a great air of paradox to it. The facts seem to go directly against it. We say, for example, not only that we do believe, but *what* we believe, employing for this purpose a *that*-clause or some other form of expression. A belief, like a place-kick, is directed at some object, an object which when you are answering a question 'what . . . ?' you single out with a word or group of words that in school we are taught to call the direct object of the verb. Just what sort of thing this object of the action is may be difficult to say, but that there is such an object seems beyond reasonable dispute.

A closer look will, however, convince us that what, strictly speaking, is beyond reasonable dispute is the linguistic fact that 'believe' is frequently followed by a string of words starting 'that . . .' or 'in . . .'. This is an undeniable fact of the language. But it is not undeniable that such a string is the direct object of the verb; this is a grammatical allegation, a grammatical allegation the reasons for which would have to go far beyond the bare fact that we say things like 'I believe in the abolition of capital punishment'.

It is not, then, facts of language which have led philosophers to the view that belief plays upon objects; it is a construction

* Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Peirce Society, Dec. 1962, and at the Brown University Philosophy Colloquium, May, 1963. For critical suggestions I must thank Professors Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz, Roderick Chisholm, and Herbert Heidelberger.

put on these facts. So the question I ask is which is the best way, grammatically, to construe belief-sentences?

To answer this question I have distinguished five different grammars of belief-sentences. The first three I discuss construe the clause as the direct object of the verb—*transitivity grammars*, they might be called. The last two deny that the clause is the direct object and assign it a different role. The last of these two, the fifth grammar, argues for calling the *that*-clause a kind of predicate of the verb. I conclude with this grammar because I find it the best, and because I find it the best I conclude that belief has no object. But this conclusion follows equally from the fourth grammar, J. O. Urmson's, which assigns to the verb 'believe' a kind of modal or parenthetical force and to its clause a statemental role. Bluntly put, Urmson gives the verb an adverbial role, while the fifth grammar gives the clause an adverbial role.

I also try to use these distinctions of grammar in an auxiliary way to classify various analyses of belief; e.g., Russell's triadic depiction of belief as a three-termed relation relating a mind to a thing and its predicate fits the third, or *factitive grammar*.

One last comment: it may be objected that all this rigamarole with language is quite beside the point; that no matter what words we use in whatever grammatical form to express our beliefs, the beliefs have a certain structure, a structure which is not dependent on the way in which they are expressed. So, finding the right grammar of belief-sentences is not tantamount to discovering the true structure of belief. To discover the true structure of belief turn your eye inward and scan the thing itself.

I can answer this objection only with a testimonial: when I turn my eye inward the only things I see are belief-questions, and belief-statements, and so forth; and I cannot help but see them in a certain grammatical form—I think in English. Thus, what often passes for introspective acuity is, I should guess, only grammatical gullibility.

Historically the *that*-clause construction arose by a transformation of an old paratactic construction. The O.E.D. suggests the following as the probable steps in the transformation (the first three are the paratactic, or double-sentence constructions):¹

- a. He once lived here: we all know *that*
- b. *That* (now *this*) we all know: he once lived here
- c. We all know *that*: he once lived here
- d. We all know *that* he once lived here
- e. We all know he once lived here

¹ *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, 1933), vol. XI, p. 253.

The important change is from *c* to *d*, for here 'that' is used in a new way. In the first three it is a demonstrative pronoun, but in *d* it has "sunk into a conjunctive particle, and (like the relative pronoun) become stressless."

In the paratactic constructions the direct object of the verb 'know' is the demonstrative pronoun 'that'. But what does 'that' pick out? It apparently picks out the same thing the sentence apposed to it picks out, the sentence 'he once lived here'. It is like saying, "Look at that: the red ball." So it is tempting to speculate that this early construction was poorly designed to meet the demand that the direct object of the verb be a singular term, as 'this' is, but as 'he once lived here' is not. Let me call this demand the Requirement of Transitivity; what it requires is that the direct object of a verb be some sort of singular term, either a proper name or a definite description or a demonstrative pronoun. Since a sentence is not a proper name or any other sort of singular term, a conscience-salving demonstrative pronoun is put in its place. If this is (or was) the purpose of the construction, it is a makeshift piece of work: it does provide a singular term, 'that', for the direct object of the verb, but this singular term is but a stand-in for the nonsingular sentence that follows it. The Requirement of Transitivity is put off, not satisfied.

1. The first grammar, however, does satisfy the Requirement. According to it, "John believes that he once lived here" is an example of the primary sentence pattern for expressions of belief. In this sentence the string of words 'that he once lived here' is said to function as the direct object of the verb 'believes'. I shall therefore symbolize it '*x V that-s*', letting 'V' represent the verb and letting the positions immediately to the left and right of 'V' be for the subject and direct object, respectively.

This is the orthodox grammar. Before looking at its details, what does it imply? It seems to imply, since the verb has both a subject and object, that the act or relation expressed by this verb relates a person to something picked out or named by the *that*-clause. This something so named is either the object of the action or the second term of the relation. G. E. Moore was led, I should guess, by just this grammatical feature of belief sentences to say "if we want to give a name to any belief—to point out what belief we are talking about, and to distinguish it from other different beliefs, we always have to do it . . . by means of these expressions beginning with 'that'—'that lions exist', 'that bears exist' and so on. . . ."² That *that*-clauses are names Moore

² *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), pp. 256, 257.

has no doubt, but what they name troubles him a great deal. For when a belief is true the clause seems to name both the belief and the fact the existence of which makes the belief true. But I want to short-cut perplexity of this kind by asking whether it is ever proper to say of these clauses that they are names.

There are two different kinds of reasons for calling an expression a name. First, expressions can be so classified because they are employed, often alone, in a certain kind of verbal ceremony, such as christening, calling, addressing, introducing, or identifying; second, they are so classified in virtue of certain syntactical features. For *that*-clauses—and this seems to be a peculiarity they have—only this latter sort of justification can be offered for their being names; only syntactical reasons can be found for calling them singular terms.

What, then, are the reasons for calling these clauses singular terms? First, they occupy the singular positions of subject and object (a predicative phrase such as 'is round' cannot occupy these positions); second, they are used appositely to specify certain common nouns such as 'hope', 'assertion', and 'belief', as in "the hope, namely, that rain will fall"; finally, they do sometimes replace the pronoun 'it', and they can sometimes be used to answer *what*-questions, e.g., "what do you think of this proposal?" These are powerful considerations, perhaps as powerful as the feeling of helpless perplexity about what, if *that*-clauses are names, they do name. (Do they name things? or facts about things? or only alleged facts about things? or possibly only alleged facts about alleged things?) It would be much better if we did not have to answer such questions, and we would not have to answer such questions if we could show that there are no grounds for saying *that*-clauses are names.

Let us try to see, then, whether the powerful reasons for saying they are names (or singular terms) are invincible. Consider first the point that they occur in the singular position of the direct object of the verb. It is clear that they cannot occupy such a position unless it exists, unless verbs such as 'believe' do govern a position of direct object. Does 'believe' govern such a position? How can we tell when a verb is being used transitively? The only way to tell, so far as I can see, is by determining whether it is followed by a singular term that is neither the subject nor a predicate noun: thus 'hit' is used transitively in "John hit the ball" since 'the ball' is a singular term. Transitivity does not show singularity; it presupposes it. So, the verb 'believe' is transitive if the *that*-clause is a singular term, not the other way

about: the transitivity of the verb presupposes rather than implies the singularity of the clause.

The clause does occur, however, in positions other than the questionably singular spot after the word 'believe': it sometimes is the subject of a sentence such as "That *p* is true (is likely, is a fact)." Do these occurrences count in favor of the clause's being singular, or does the nonsingularity of the clause rather show that these are not genuine nominative occurrences? It seems clear that, if the predicate, e.g., 'is true', is genuinely a predicate, the position of the clause would have to be nominative and the clause therefore singular. If, on the other hand, 'true' is not a real predicate, as Strawson has argued, then neither the nominative position nor the singularity of the clause is shown.

The second reason given for clauses' being singular terms is that they can be put in apposition to certain common nouns for the purpose of specification: thus 'the belief (hope, prayer, . . .) that war will be averted' is compared to 'the man (accountant, senator, . . .) Tom Jones', and the very function of appositive specification seems to imply that the apposing term is specific or singular. If I want to know which man you are talking about, you will give me his name: 'Tom Jones'; and if I want to know what belief you are defending so vigorously, you will give me its name: 'that war will be averted'.

This reasoning is no better than the first. There is an important difference between the terms 'man' and 'belief'. 'Belief' is a verbal noun; so syntactical conclusions about constructions in which it occurs presuppose prior conclusions about the verb 'believe'. If the clause is not a singular term in constructions with 'believe', it is not a singular term in constructions with 'belief': what is good for one is good for the other: "my belief, viz., that *p*" does not show 'that *p*' to be singular unless "what I believe, viz., that *p*" shows it to be singular—which, I argued above, it does not.

2. This second is not strictly a new grammar at all, since it does not offer a new classification of either the verb or the clause. 'Believe' is, for this grammar as for the first, a transitive verb, and the clause is its direct object; it also meets the demand that the clause, being a direct object, be a singular term. It differs from the first only over what the clause names (a semantic rather than a grammatical difference), suggesting that the clause be construed as the name of a sentence. 'Believe' is a partially metalinguistic verb which expresses an act or disposition the object of which is a sentence.

The same symbols, *x* V that-*s*', can be used to fix the form

of this grammar as were used for the first, with the difference that the particle '*that*' here has the force of quotation marks in forming the name of the sentence that it precedes.

Carnap's depiction of belief in *Meaning and Necessity*³ counts as an instance of this view. He proposes that the sentence-form "X believes that *p*" be analyzed as follows:

X has a disposition to respond affirmatively to some sentence in a specified semantical system which is intensionally isomorphic with the sentence "*p*" (61-62).

Belief is a disposition to a *yes*-response (a word intensionally isomorphic with 'yes'?), and the object of belief is the sentence that provokes that response, which would not necessarily be the sentence appearing after the word 'that' in "He believes that . . .".

There has been a good deal of discussion of the adequacy of Carnap's analysis of belief; this is not the question that concerns me here. I want to show only that Carnap's account is grammatically quite orthodox, that it follows the ordinary grammar in calling the *that*-clause a singular term which is object of the verb, and that it thus alters very little the grammatically tinged picture of belief as an act (dispositional) directed upon a certain object. What is novel is that these objects are sentences standing in the special relation of intensional isomorphism to the sentence that occurs in the *that*-clause; this, however, is a pointless novelty if the act-object model of belief is itself indefensible, as I think it is.

Before going on to the two grammars that do question the transitivity of 'believe', there is a third transitive grammar which bears mentioning.

3. I shall call this a *factive* grammar after the factitive verbs such as 'make' and 'paint'. The standard examples of the factitive construction are "They made him their ruler" and "He painted it green," to which I want to add "They believed (thought) him their ruler."

This is a peculiar construction. In a moment I shall try to explain just how its peculiarity has been exploited in the explanation of belief, but first I want to show why it is peculiar. Consider the following array of transitive-verb constructions (for the sake of symmetry I shall use 'think' and 'appoint' as my factitive verbs):

- a. The committee appointed/thought (of) Jones
- b. The committee appointed/thought Jones chairman
- c. The committee appointed/thought of chairman Jones
- d. The committee thought that Jones was chairman
appointed Jones to be chairman

³ Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947, pp. 54-55, 61-62.

Both *a* and *c* are ordinary subject-verb-object constructions with perfectly straightforward direct objects, the proper nouns 'Jones' or 'chairman Jones'. The direct object in *d* is, of course, troublesome, appearing to name, as it does, a proposition or some such difficult entity. But *d* has the advantage over *a* and *c* in point of information: in *d* we are told what the committee thought of Jones and what they appointed him to, but in *a* and *c* this information is not given; these simpler constructions are, in point of information, incomplete.

The factitive example, *b*, seems to have the best of both worlds. The direct object is the untroublesome proper name 'Jones', and yet no information is withheld as to what he was appointed to/thought to be. In *a* and *c* this collateral information is missing because of the simplicity of their grammatical form: in them only one predication is made, the predication of thinking or appointing to the committee. The provision of this collateral information in *d* costs the construction its grammatical simplicity: it contains two predication, the second of which tells us the position of Jones without making a second predication; it gives us a clause, 'Jones But the factitive construction seems to provide this information chairman', which is not really a clause.

Let me put this a little more starkly. The object of the action in *a* and *c* is *Jones*; in *d* the object of the action is *Jones being chairman*; in the factitive example, *b*, the object of the action is *Jones chairman*.

The peculiarity of the factitive construction, then, is that the verb is followed by a complex expression which, although it is not a clause, is clause-like, and which, although it is not a phrase, is phrase-like; without naming propositions a propositional job is done.

In symbols the factitive grammar would look like this: ' $x V y, f$ ', or, grouped rationally, ' $V(x, y, f)$ '. ' f ' is understood to take general terms rather than singular terms, i.e., adjectives, common nouns, or participles but not finite verbs.

If belief sentences do have this form, then clearly the objects of belief are not propositions, nor, apparently, abstract entities of any sort. If I believe Tom tall, then, this grammar seems to imply, my belief is directed at two things, first at Tom (' y ' in the symbols), and second at tall (' f ' in the symbols). Belief is a three-termed relation between a person, a particular, and the property *believed to be applicable* to that particular. But this way of putting it will not do at all: the italicized words have to come out: I believe Tom tall, not that tallness is applicable to Tom. If the factitive reading of belief sentences is nothing more

than a substitution of "I believe Tom tall" for "I believe that Tom is tall," where the former is to be understood as "I believe that tallness is applicable to Tom," then one kind of propositional term has been covertly substituted for another. If, however, the italicized phrase *believed to be applicable* is dropped, there is no reason to connect what I believe about tallness and what I believe about Tom; i.e., to say I believe Tom tall is to say I have an attitude toward Tom and tallness, and this is not an adequate account of my belief that Tom is tall.

The factitive grammar is one of several tactics for avoiding the propositional term in belief sentences. These tactics all follow the same pattern and thus suffer from the same sort of fault.

A propositional term such as 'that Tom is tall' is propositional in virtue of the predicative tie, in this case 'is'. Thus, the factitive grammar avoids this propositional term by suppressing the 'is' and thereby eliminating the predication. The predication cannot be eliminated without incurring the consequence noted above. So the predicative tie which has been suppressed in the propositional term must be reintroduced somewhere else, and this is usually done by affixing it to the verb 'believe' itself. Compare the following three patterns of predicative relocation—the first is the factitive, the second is Quine's, and the third is Brentano's (Brentano-like)⁴:

The sentence "I believe (IB) that Tom is tall" becomes

(1)	(2)	(3)
IB Tom tall	IB "Tom is tall"	I accept tall Tom

which then become, after predicative relocation,

IB-true-of-Tom, tallness	IB-true "Tom is tall"	I accept-as-tall Tom
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These are, however, just oblique ways of reintroducing the original clause in an altered form; i.e., (1) is "I believe that tallness is true of Tom," (2) is "I believe the sentence 'Tom is tall' is true," and (3) is "I accept (the fact) that Tom is tall."

The next two grammars are radical. They both deny, for quite different reasons, that the verb 'believe' is transitive, that it takes a direct object at all. This, of course, means that the clause or phrase that follows the verb must be given a different syntactical role than the one it is ordinarily thought to have.

⁴ Russell gives a triadic analysis in *Problems of Philosophy* (London, Oxford 1912), p. 124 ff. Quine's account is in *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1960), p. 212. Chisholm suggested the Brentano to me; see *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), ed. by Chisholm, pp. 71 ff.

4. Urmson assigns the verb 'believe' to the class of verbs that lack a present continuous tense; i.e., we do not say "I am believing . . .".⁵ (I'm not sure whether there are exceptions to this generalization or not, but I think it is for the most part true.) He restricts his classification further, however, by setting out a subclass of verbs lacking the present continuous tense: parenthetical verbs, to which belongs 'believe'.

Parentheticality is a feature of word order, a feature apparently possessed by all *that*-clause verbs. It can be illustrated as follows:

a. He once, we all believe, lived here

The subject and verb of the so-called main clause can be shifted around in the sentence, occurring either at the beginning, in the middle (parenthetically), or at the end.

What does this show? Despite the title of the paper, Urmson does not attach too much significance to this grammatical property. He holds that parenthetical verbs are not historical or descriptive verbs, but he does not say that this is because they are parenthetical. Parentheticality does, nevertheless, point in this direction. Their function is, then, rather to prime or orient us to the way in which the statement is to be taken. The principal assertion in *a* is that he once lived here, not that we all believe something; this latter is just the background music. Thus 'presume' and 'believe' signal evidence; 'regret' and 'rejoice' show feeling; and 'conclude' and 'infer' mark argument. 'We all believe' functions not as a main clause, denoting a state or act of the subject, but as a hopeful and auxiliary cue of anticipated general assent. It is, or has the force of, a modal adverb such as 'evidently'.

There are three things I want to look at. What does parentheticality show? what does failure of the continuous tense show? and how do these two grammatical features connect?

I do not see, first, any reason to connect parentheticality to modal (orienting) force. Indeed, with a slight and plausible change in the wording of *a* we get something like the archaic paratactic construction mentioned above:

b. He once, we all believe this, lived here

the parenthesis having the force of a nearly coordinate assertion. And we can and do use parentheses in direct and indirect quotation,

c. He once, I muttered, lived here

⁵ J. O. Urmson, "Parenthetical Verbs," in *Logic and Language* (London: Blackwell 1956), ed. by A. Flew, pp. 192 ff.

where there is no question but that the force is reportorial rather than modal. I imagine this is why Urmson is careful not to rest his case just on the grammatical feature of parentheticality—he anticipates this sort of objection. A parenthetical verb is a verb that (1) can be used parenthetically or without an indicative *that*-clause, (2) can be so used in the first-person present perfect tense, and (3) lacks the present continuous tense (192, 193). Clauses 2 and 3 exclude example *a*; clause 3 excludes *b*. Parentheticality unsupported by the other criteria comes to very little. Between it and modality there is no indissoluble union, only a casual liaison.

Perhaps, however, the absence of the present continuous tense shows modality. Urmson notes the use of the present continuous tense of most verbs to indicate the going-on or taking-place of the action, as contrasted with the use of present perfect; Onions calls it the Habitual Present, to show customary or habitual action. He suggests that the absence of the present continuous tense in verbs like 'believe' and 'suppose' shows not simply that they fail to convey continuation of the actions in question, but that they fail to describe any action whatsoever, either habitual or at-present going-on. Their present perfect tense is not, lacking as it does the contrasting present continuous, a habitual or dispositional present. What is it then? It is, Urmson seems to imply for the parentheticals at any rate (197), a tense which, like 'ought', the old irregular past tense of 'owe', has been drafted for modality. These verbs enjoy with the modal auxiliaries a sort of tenseless state, or, put another way, their tense-particle has become a modal rather than a temporal indicator. (Urmson explains their use in the past and the future as the present reports of formerly issued or anticipated mood signals.) Their force is, then, adverbial rather than verbal, but adverbial in the manner of their counterpart conjunctive adverbs, 'regretfully', 'supposedly', and 'therefore', which modify, not the verb, but the whole sentence or statement (199, 200). They give, to use a term from prosody, the tone of what we say.

This all may be true of these verbs, but I do not see that it is shown to be so by their having this grammatical feature of continuous-tense failure. I should point out that Urmson does not anywhere say outright that this grammatical feature does betoken nondescriptiveness or modality. He does in several passages, e.g., on pages 201 and 204, imply, however, a connection between failure of the continuous tense and nondescriptiveness. It is this implication I wish to attack; for I think we can imagine other reasons.

reasons compatible with the descriptive or reportorial role of these verbs, why they should lack the continuous tense. They might, e.g., report actions that cannot be continued. Consider the verb 'blink'. The present continuous tense of this verb, "I am blinking," indicates not continuation but repetition of the action; it has, as for many other verbs, frequentative or iterative force. Suppose, however, that fatigue factors for the eyelid muscles were such as to prevent the repetition of a blink for some hours; then the verb 'blink' might lack a present continuous tense—cf., 'sneeze', which is rarely used in this tense. Or perhaps they lack this tense because they report a settled state or condition like the condition of being under an obligation—e.g., "I am owing him \$10.00"? Indeed, if 'believe' expresses a *propositional attitude*, as some philosophers used to say, then, since an attitude is a continuing state rather than a momentary act, to assert its continuation would be redundant and silly; cf., "I am being happy."

The present continuous tense does not, then, always indicate the going-on of an action: it sometimes has frequentative force. But what is more surprising is that it occasionally has just the orienting or modal force that Urmson ascribes to verbs defective of this tense. Consider:

The plan, I am saying (thinking), ought to be abandoned.

This suggests that it is the first-person present tense which, for *that*-clause verbs, shows modality, whether present perfect or present continuous. Why this should be so, at least for the verbs of indirect discourse, seems fairly clear. To report what you are saying while you are saying it is not very useful or newsworthy. Thus 'I say' or 'I am saying' is employed to cue, rather than to make pointless progress reports of your sayings as you say them.

But this cannot be the whole story, since those few verbs of indirection, such as 'think', which allow of a present continuous form could be used to mark a thought in progress that would otherwise escape notice.

The contrast between 'say' and 'speak' and 'talk' may be of some help. The emphasis is increasingly, from 'say' to 'talk', on the uttering rather than the utterance. 'Say', we might say, is the most topical: it is hardly ever used without its topical clause. 'Speak' and 'talk' can be used topically, but only with a rudimentary topical expression such as a prepositional phrase that gives the subject but not the contents of the speech. With 'speak' and 'talk' the intransitive, act-emphasizing uses are prominent.

There is no analogous set of psychological verbs. 'Think' can be used topically with a *that*-clause or topically with an *of*-phrase

or intransitively with act-emphasizing force. 'Believe', on the other hand, is seldom and perhaps never nontopical and intransitive.

Does this then show that the topical, the *that*-clause, the parenthetical uses of these verbs are nondescriptive, adverbial, and modal? I do not think so. I think the most that can be said is that their topical use is not act-emphasizing and that they are frequently used, especially in the first-person present, with such modal force. For the nonmodal uses of these verbs, perplexity remains as to the role of the *that*-clause.

The next grammar will try to remove some of the perplexity.

5. This last grammar aims at the clause instead of the verb: rather than demote the verb, it abolishes its direct object. It denies the singularity of the *that*-clause, asserts the intransitivity of the verb, and assigns the words that follow it to a different part of speech. The *that*-clause is a predicate, not a singular term; its function is to modify, not to stand as the direct object.

The question is, then, what does it modify? There are two answers to this question, separating off the two species of the grammar. The adverbial species answers that the clause is a predicate of the verb (propositions are properties of actions); the adjectival species answers that the clause modifies some suppressed singular term (for Scheffler an inscription-name, for C. I. Lewis "the universe"). My usual technique of illustrating each grammar with an English sentence pattern will not work here because there are no devices for making a clause look like an adjective rather than a noun. It can be done artificially, however, as follows. For the adverbial:

- a. We all believe (that-he-once-lived-here)-ishly
- b. $x \ V^{(that-p-ishly)}$

For the adjectival:

- c. We all believe a that-he-once-lived-here thing
- d. $x \ V \ y^{(that-p-ish)}$

Bergmann has argued for an account of awareness which at points coincides with what I have here called the *adverbial* view.⁶ His verb is 'aware' not 'believe', the latter introducing, I am sure he would say, many extra complications. He puts his analysis metalinguistically; I shall ignore that for the moment. In terms

⁶ Gustav Bergmann, "Intentionality," in *Meaning and Existence* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960), pp. 24 and 25.

of *that*-clauses, then, the analysis of 'aware that *a* is green' goes like this:

b is a case of awareness & *b* is (*that-a-is green*)-ish

The *that*-clause is an adverb of awareness; propositions are characteristics of mental acts. This, as I have indicated, is false on one point. Bergmann's adverb is not a *that*-clause, but a quoted sentence, "*a* is green." This makes his view perhaps even more startling, since he gives what he calls the *quoting operator* a predicate-forming rather than the customary name-forming function: "Every sentence of *L* surrounded by quotes becomes a non-relational first-order predicate."

Scheffler construes the *that*-clause as an adjective of concrete inscriptions.⁷ Again, the verb 'believe' is not treated by him; he applies his analysis only to the modest verb of indirect discourse, 'write'. But, with this difference, his analysis can be put in a form very close to *c* (in his new book, *Anatomy of Inquiry*, he does, I understand, use the verb 'believes-true' in his inscriptional account); for "*x* writes that *p*," Scheffler gives,

x inscribes (some concrete inscription) *y* & *y* is (*that-p*)-ish

or

x inscribes a (*that-p*)-ish inscription

(This is my own way of putting it; Scheffler does not use the suffix '-ish'.) Using 'verbs' as neutral between 'believes', 'is aware', and 'inscribes', the two views come out as '*x* verbs (*that-p*)-ishly' and '*x* verbs a (*that-p*)-ish thing'.

C. I. Lewis put forward a curious variant of the adjectival grammar which falls somewhere between this grammar and the factitive.⁸ His propositional terms are not noun-clauses but participial phrases—his example "Mary baking pies"—which can be entertained in a number of different ways (modes). To entertain these adjectival propositions assertively is to assert them of the universe, to say, e.g., that Mary baking pies is true of the world.

This predicate grammar suffers from considerable initial im-

⁷ "An Inscriptional Approach to Indirect Quotation," *Analysis*, 14 (March 1954): 83. Scheffler gives a direct-discourse version of his analysis as well (substitute "'*p*'-ish" for "'*that-p*-ish'"). In the direct-discourse version, each inscription characterized by '*p*'-ishness is a replica of every other one so characterized. In the indirect-discourse version, the relation is rephrasal rather than replication, to allow, as grammarians say, for the adaptation of the words to the circumstances in which they are now quoted.

⁸ *An Analysis of Knowledge and Evaluation* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946), pp. 49 ff.

plausibility. Why call the noun-clause an adverb or an adjective? Granted that doubt may be cast on its substantive character, it is hard to see what amount of effort could prove it a predicate. Questions like "What do you believe?", "There must be *something* you believe?", and "Do you believe *it*?" seem, with their pronoun place-holders, impossible to explain away; *that*-clauses denote somethings, whats, and its.

Let me try, nevertheless, to deprecate some of the implausibility of assimilating *how* with *what* we believe.

Adverbs, or expressions with adverbial force, are a multifarious lot, and we must not boggle because of some absurd assimilation such as of 'that he shouts' to 'jerkily'. If the *that*-clause has adverbial force, it is most plausibly that of an internal accusative like 'the waltz' in "he danced the waltz" or that of a prepositional phrase like 'at the rabbit' in "he shot at the rabbit."⁹ (Cf. "he

Consider the clause then an internal accusative.¹⁰ The difficulty with this is that while internal accusatives seem logically to depend on the verb, *that*-clauses do not. If no one is dancing, the waltz is not performed, but that he once lived here is not threatened by the total absence in the world of any awareness or belief. What is internally accusative to believing is belief, and to saying speech, and to asking question, not *what* is believed, said, or asked. This does, however, suggest an answer of sorts. If a belief can be an internal accusative, why not a contracted belief, a belief that *p*? For, just as there can be no belief in the absence of all believing, there can be no belief that *p* in the absence of all believing. This is not very satisfactory, however. The clause is not shown to be an internal accusative by the shoddy device of affixing it to a verbal noun that is an internal accusative; the question then is whether the clause is internally accusative to the verbal noun. (An analogous objection holds against the contention that sensed qualities such as red are internally accusative to sensing: "I sense a red sense-quality" unquestionably has 'sense-

⁹ Ducasse, giving credit to S. Alexander, calls these "cognate accusatives." See his discussion of them in "Moore's 'The Refutation of Idealism,'" *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, (New York: Tudor, 1952), ed. by Paul Schilpp, pp. 228 ff., and Moore's remarks in reply, p. 659. See also R. Chisholm, *Perceiving* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Univ. of Cornell Press, 1957), and Ducasse, *Nature, Mind, and Death* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1951).

¹⁰ The direct object of a verb is an internal accusative if and only if (1) there is an optional intransitive verb-form, e.g., 'my toe hurts' for 'I feel a pain in my toe', and (2) that which is picked out by the direct object exists only if an action of the sort expressed by the verb is being performed.

quality' internally accusative to the verb, but the relation between 'red' and 'sense-quality' is still to be explained.)¹¹

The thing to do is to understand better the machinery of the internal accusative, to explain why it should logically depend on the verb. This is not too hard to explain. The relation between the verb and its internal accusative is that of class inclusion, but this is obscured by the verb–direct object construction. This can be seen by rewriting

He danced the tango

as

He performed a dance, specifically the tango

The relation between 'a dance' and 'the tango' is perfectly luminous, and so also is the dependence of the one on the other. I think it is also plain what need prompts this construction: since *to tango* is not quite a bona fide verb, a device is needed for making such a verb. So, from the generic verb *to dance*, the more specific verb is formed by the addition of the internal accusative. (Cf. "I hurt" and "I feel a pain.") We could, in the same way use the verb 'perform' as a verb of all trades, more specific verbs being got from it by the addition of internal accusatives:

He performed a walk, a shooting, a dance, etc.

and ordinary adverbs would become adjectives of the internal accusatives:

He performed an *expert* tango

If now we insert an adjectival place-holder for 'expert':

He performed *just such* a tango

impressively similar forms can be got for 'think' and 'believe':

He entertained just such a thought, that prices will fall

He held just such a belief, that . . .

The *that*-clause, in virtue of these similarities, might plausibly be called an adjective of internal accusatives, and thus be assigned adverbial force.

The adjectival and the adverbial versions of this grammar, thus, seem to coincide so long as the adjectives are read as modifying internal accusatives.

The verbs of indirect discourse are perhaps more straightforward. 'Inscribe an inscription' and 'vocalize a vocable' are

¹¹ Ducasse, *op. cit.*

clearly internally accusative, and it is not implausible to construe the clauses of 'say' and 'write' as adjectives of such accusatives.¹² These verbs, however, have a productive feature: saying and writing implies the making of a sound or mark. The *that*-clause can thus be said to be either a predicate of what the action produces (the sound or the written mark), or of the act itself, either and perhaps both of which are denoted by the internal accusatives 'writing' and 'saying'. (Compare 'He wrote in English' with 'He wrote English words'.)

Belief and thought, not being causal or productive in this way, do not (their associated verbs do not) suffer from internal-accusative ambiguity: like writing in the air or making the sign of the cross, they leave behind, perhaps, only molecular eddies.

I do not know, to use some words of Ryle, what more is to be said about the logical grammar of the word, save that there is much more to be said. This saying has perhaps a more than usual aptness because of my preoccupation with one feature of the verb 'believe', its disposition to take clauses. My object has been more belief-objects than belief. But this prompts the question of *that*-clauses in other than belief contexts. If propositions have been exorcized by parsing these clauses not as propositional names but as predicates of the verb, what is to be said of their occurrences in verbless contexts, e.g., 'it is true that *p*'? Surely here 'that *p*' is the logical subject for the predicate 'true'. My quick answer to this is that it seems always possible to insert an internally accusative verbal noun, e.g., 'statement', 'belief', 'assertion', into such contexts as subject for the predicative *that*-clause. The clause 'that *p*' would then modify 'statement' or 'belief', and 'true' be predicated of that complex: what is true is the belief that . . . belief has no object.

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¹² There are a few cases of what might be called adverbial indirect discourse: "He pooh-poohed my suggestion," and "He hailed (damned) me."

BOOK REVIEW

The Political Ideas of St. Augustine. HERBERT A. DEANE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. xix, 356 p. \$7.50.

Both Hobbes and Machiavelli have been credited, or charged, with initiating a revolution in political thought that dethroned the classical ideals of a just society composed of virtuous men ruled for the common good. Iconoclastic though they may have been, they were not the first to break these pagan idols. Classical political thought, which regarded men as capable of knowing and hence doing the good, had already been attacked by a canonized convert to Christianity, St. Augustine.

Augustine was not ignorant of the tradition he repudiated. Before his conversion, Augustine had sought knowledge as well as pleasure. If his Christian writings show signs of a past Manicheanism and a transcended Platonism, they show even greater evidences of his profession—rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric. Augustine was a professional speaker and writer, a professional teacher of Latin literature. Clearly he brought his rhetorical skills with him when he became a Christian and a bishop; like Hobbes and Machiavelli, he was a masterful prose stylist.

Like Hobbes, and like Machiavelli, Augustine took a cold, hard look at the nature of men and their societies. Mankind is a mass of sin. Since Adam's fall, men have been born and have lived in sin, unable to be happy, unable to live rightly. In this world, man lives a life of continuous desire and continuous anxiety. The virtues themselves testify to the difficulties of this life; prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude would all be meaningless if there were no evils to avoid or to bear. Men are enslaved to these miseries as they are enslaved to sin by the chains of love. Men lust after pleasure, gain, and power, believing that these things will make them happy. They would use the whole world, even God, to satisfy their selfish desires. From infancy on, a man's pride, his desire to be the center of everything, to have all obey his wish, is frustrated by other men, by ignorance and mistake, and by the emptiness of those satisfactions he does achieve. Each man is a slave to the things by which he seeks happiness. To gain wealth or power, he goes through misery and frustration. To safeguard what he has against its painful loss, he suffers continual anxiety. To acquire and safeguard their ephemeral satisfactions, men use every device, every subterfuge, every crime. Only by fear are they restrained from committing the robberies and mur-

ders of their secret wishes. And, if wishes could kill, not only the Chinese Mandarin but also our neighbors and rivals, even our relatives and friends would die.

Not all men love earthly goods. There are a few men who, through no merit of their own, have been called to a different love, the love of God to the contempt of themselves. They are pre-destined members of the City of God. Here on earth they are pilgrims, sojourners using the world, even to a certain extent enjoying it, but not loving it, not at home in it. Believing in Christ, they hopefully await the last judgment which will unify them with Him and with the other members of His City, both angels and men, living and dead.

The rest of mankind, along with the fallen angels, may also be said to form a city, the earthly city. All human history is the history of these two cities, which are indistinguishably intermingled on earth. All earthly states, even if they are officially Christian (as was the Roman Empire when Augustine wrote), are parts of the earthly city. No earthly society is part of the City of God, for even those societies which represent and foreshadow Christ's Kingdom (the Hebrew commonwealth and the Church militant) are full of worldly, sinful men. It is impossible to separate good men from evil, the saints from the damned, on earth—many now outside the Church will be found inside it, many inside will be found outside.

The earthly city is in continual conflict, not only with the good, but within itself. Each man and each group within it constantly strives for a larger share of the goods of this life, wealth and power. The earthly city is divided within itself by lawsuits, quarrels, and wars. Although earthly goods can only be enjoyed in some kind of earthly peace, war is made in order to achieve a more satisfactory peace—more satisfactory because it satisfies the *libido dominandi*, the lust for rule. This desire for rule, man's pride aping God in the attempt to dominate other men, is characteristic of all human societies. The difference between a robber band and a kingdom is not a difference of quality but one of quantity. Size rather than the possession of the virtue of justice distinguishes the one from the other.

And so, justice removed, what are kingdoms but great robber bands? And what are robber bands but small kingdoms [*Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi parua regna?*] The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince; it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes pos-

session of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. (*De Civitate Dei*, iv. 4; quoted in Deane, p. 127)

If we were to accept Cicero's definition of a commonwealth: "a commonwealth is the property (or weal) of a people [*res publica res populus*]. But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good" (*De Republica*, i. 25), then we would have to admit that no Roman republic and no true states have ever existed. For Cicero argues that there can be no commonwealth without true justice, and no society can attain justice unless it gives each his due. But no society gives God his due, with one exception, that society of which Christ is the head, which alone possesses true justice and true peace, the City of God. Augustine rejects Cicero's definition and adopts a different one. On this definition, even Rome (which, as Augustine anticipated Machiavelli in emphasizing, was founded by a fratricide, just as the first earthly city had been founded by the first fratricide—Cain) is a commonwealth notwithstanding its internal conflicts, its corruption, its vices, its crimes, its civil wars. As long as a group of reasonable beings are bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then that group is a people and its administration is a republic (*De Civitate Dei*, xix. 24).

Various societies differ, therefore, according to what they love; the better the object of love, the better the society. Only the City of God loves what is truly good—God. All earthly societies love other things: some luxury, others wealth, still others internal (earthly) peace or justice. The Romans, dominated by the lust for rule, subjected their other vices to the discipline of that single great vice and so conquered the world. Yet, these earthly cities, and the relative peace, order, and justice that they maintain are not evil, but in their own way good—though not of course ultimately good.

This is the outline of Augustine's political thought that emerges from Professor Deane's study. It establishes Augustine as one of the most important (and most influential) thinkers in one tradition of western political thought. Augustine emerges as profoundly skeptical about the possibilities of realizing the good life, the just life, the perfect life on earth. The millennium is not going to arrive as the result of human political action; even if

philosophers become kings, or emperors become Christians, there will be no rest from troubles in this world. Men are, and will always be, imperfect, fallible, greedy, and selfish; they may be cruel, harsh, and criminal as well. In such a world, the best that can be hoped for is some relatively stable situation—a peace and order enforced by men on other men, the peace imposed by the state, with its judges and soldiers and hangmen to enforce its laws and carry out its punishments.

Professor Deane's book is the only full study of St. Augustine's political thought in English. The task itself is formidable. St. Augustine never wrote a systematic treatise on politics; almost all of his works were polemics—stimulated by a question, a problem, an opponent to be dealt with. The *De Civitate Dei*, an acknowledged masterpiece, provides both too much and too little for an adequate understanding of St. Augustine's political thought: too much because of the book's size and scope (Augustine's political ideas are buried in this huge work), too little because not all of Augustine's politics is contained in it. To read through all of Augustine's prolific output (much of it available only in Latin) would be a long and difficult assignment—and, I fear, one beyond the powers of many students of political philosophy. The least of this book's many virtues is that it provides the student with a guide to St. Augustine's political thought and a collection of many important passages. But Deane has not merely published an anthology. He has written a fresh and critical commentary on Augustine. McIlwain's tenuous distinction (in his *Growth of Political Thought in the West*) between *regnum* or *civitas* and *res publica* has been shown to be without foundation. As much nonsense (some of it based on misrepresentation or misquotation, even to the quotation of the position St. Augustine refutes as Augustine's own) has been written about St. Augustine as about most other political philosophers; this book should dispose of much of it. Deane's work sets a standard of accuracy, scholarship, and intelligence to which any future discussion of Augustine's political thought must conform. This standard will not be easily attained, nor is it likely to be bettered.

MAURICE M. GOLDSMITH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NOTES AND NEWS

The 54th Semi-Annual Meeting of the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences will be held at The New School for Social Research in New York City on Sunday, May 3, 1964. The morning session (10:00 a.m.) will be on *Discovery in Science* and will hear papers by Prof. Norwood R. Hanson of Yale University ("The Idea of a Logic of Discovery") and Prof. Mario A. Bunge of the University of Buenos Aires ("Theory Construction: Art or Science?"), and commentary by Prof. Leonard K. Nash of Harvard University. The afternoon session will be on *The Use of Psychedelic Drugs in Psychological Research* and will hear papers by Dr. Sanford M. Unger of the National Institute of Mental Health ("The Current Scientific Status of Psychedelic Drug Research") and Dr. Timothy F. Leary ("Philosophical Questions Encountered in Psychedelic Drug Research"), and commentary by Dr. Curt J. Ducasse, Professor Emeritus of Brown University. There will be discussion from the floor at both sessions.

The fee for membership in the Conference is \$4.00 per year and may be paid at the meeting on May 3rd. The meeting is open to nonmembers for an admission charge of \$2.00. Students will be admitted for \$1.00.

A memorial meeting for Clarence Irving Lewis will be held at Harvard on April 23, at Burr Hall at 8 p.m. Speakers will include Roderick Firth, who will speak on Lewis's contribution to epistemology; William Frankena, on ethics; Nelson Goodman, on ontology; and Alonzo Church, on logic and the history of logic. Professor Rogers Albritton will chair.

The spring meeting of the Kentucky Philosophical Association will be held on the Belknap Campus of the University of Louisville, in the Library Lecture Lounge, on Saturday, April 25, beginning at 10 a.m. Donald Crosby of Centre College will speak on "Can Science Avoid Metaphysics?" and Charles Breslin of the University of Louisville on "Logic as Ontology and Ideology."



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